Demand for less skilled workers plummeted in developed countries in the 1980s. In open economies, pervasive skill biased technological change (SBTC) can explain this decline. SBTC tends to increase the domestic supply of unskill-intensive goods by releasing less-skilled labor. The more countries experiencing a SBTC the greater its potential to decrease the relative wages of less-skilled labor by increasing the world supply of unskill-intensive goods. We find strong evidence for pervasive SBTC in developed countries. Most industries increased the proportion of skilled workers despite generally rising or stable relative wages. Moreover, the same manufacturing industries simultaneously increased demand for skills in different countries. Many developing countries also show increased skill premia, a pattern consistent with SBTC.
1 1. Calculated for high school graduates with 5 years of labor market experience in Current Population Survey from Bound and Johnson [1995] , table 1.
2. Source: OECD [1992, 1993] . For specific countries, the 1979-1992 increases in unemployment were: 5.0 percent to 10.1 percent (United Kingdom); 3.2 percent to 7.7 percent (Germany); 7.6 percent to 10.7 percent (Italy); 5.9 percent to 10.2 percent (France). All are considerably larger than the U.S. increase from 5.8 percent in 1979 to 7.4 percent in 1992.
I. Introduction
Less skilled workers have suffered reduced relative wages, increased unemployment and sometimes both in the OECD economies over the 1980s. In the United States the real wages of young men with twelve or fewer years of education fell by 26 percent between 1979 and 1993, and have not recovered since. 1 Between 1979 and 1992 the average unemployment rate in European OECD countries increased from 5.4 percent to 9.9 percent 2 and has remained high, with most of the unemployment concentrated among unskilled workers. In the same period relative wages of less skilled workers declined slightly in several OECD countries and sharply in others.
Several authors have documented the decline in the relative wages of less skilled workers in the United States and the concurrent decline in their employment in manufacturing (e.g., Welch [1992, 1993] , Bound and Johnson [1992] , Katz and Murphy [1992] , and Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman [1990] ), and a number have documented similar trends in wages, employment or unemployment in other OECD countries (e.g., Freeman [1988] , Freeman and Katz [1994] , Katz and Revenga [1989] , Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower [1995] , Davis [1992] , Machin [1996a] , and Nickell and Bell [1995] ). It is now well documented that labor market outcomes of less skilled workers have worsened in the developed world in the past two decades, despite their increasing scarcity relative to the rapidly expanding supply of skilled labor.
The literature has proposed several reasons for this decline in the demand for unskilled labor, including both Stolper-Samuelson effects of increased exposure to trade from developing countries and skill biased (or unskilled labor saving) technological change (SBTC). While there is no consensus, labor economists generally believe that skill-biased technological change is the principal culprit. That belief is based on a combination of four findings: a) employment shifts to skill-intensive sectors seem too small to be consistent with explanations based on product demand shifts, such as those induced by trade, or Hicks-neutral, sector biased technological change 3 4. The H-O model has been criticized, as its property of perfectly elastic labor demand curves is inconsistent with evidence that labor supply affects wages [Freeman 1995] . One way to reconcile those two views is to recognize that the H-O model applies only in the long run, so that the short and long run effects of a local SBTC or of increased exposure to trade may differ. Since the trend increase in relative demand for skilled labor seems to have persisted for decades, long run models deserve consideration.
to be a relevant model for analyzing the long-run effect on wages of increased exposure of developed economies to LDC manufacturing over the past few decades. (The long run is long enough for factors to detach themselves from industries, allowing wages to be set by perfectly elastic demand curves.) 4 However, as Krugman [1995] has pointed out, pervasive skill-biased technological change will affect relative wages, since an integrated world economy will respond to such technological change as a closed economy would. Under standard assumptions, including homothetic preferences, skill-biased technological change releases less-skilled workers from industries, depressing their relative wages by depressing the world (relative) prices of goods intensive in less skilled work. Thus, pervasive skill-biased technological change in the developed world provides an explanation consistent with both increased wage premiums for skilled workers and within-industry substitution towards skilled workers, even in small open economy models.
Pervasive SBTC has two testable implications. 1) The within sector shifts away from unskilled labor observed in the United States should occur throughout the developed world. 2)
These shifts should be concentrated in the same industries in different countries. Using data on the employment of production and nonproduction workers in manufacturing from 10 developed countries in the 1980s, we find evidence consistent with both predictions. In all those countries we find large scale within-industry substitution away from unskilled labor despite rising or stable relative wages in the 1980s. Moreover, the cross country correlations of within-industry increases in employment of skilled workers are generally positive and often quite large.
The manufacturing industries which experience the greatest skill upgrading in our developed country sample are those associated with the spread of microprocessor technology.
Electrical machinery, machinery (including computers), and printing and publishing together account for 46 percent of the within-industry increase in relative demand for skills in our 1980s
sample. Case studies reveal that these three industries underwent significant technological changes associated largely with the assimilation of microprocessors [United States Department of Labor 4 1982a , 1982b . Casual empiricism suggests a pervasive spread of microprocessors within these and other manufacturing industries in the 1980s. This pattern provides evidence by demonstrating a common technology linking similar patterns of skill-upgrading across countries.
Evidence from the developing world is also consistent with the SBTC hypothesis. Several studies have found increased relative wages of skilled labor in LDCs undergoing trade liberalization in the 1980s, despite the opposite Stolper-Samuelson prediction [Feliciano 1995; Hanson and Harrison 1995; Robbins 1995] . We examine a larger sample of developing countries, finding that relative wages also increased in many developing countries during a decade of trade liberalization in the 1980s.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we discuss skill-biased technological change in a H-O framework, contrasting the effects of local and pervasive SBTC on wages. In Section III we test one implication of SBTC, presenting evidence on within-industry changes in the employment of skills in OECD countries. We also examine alternative explanations for withinindustry skill upgrading. Section IV presents further evidence of pervasive technological change, describing common technological changes across countries. In section V we examine evidence that SBTC is pervasive in developing countries as well as developed. Section VI concludes.
II. Local vs. Pervasive Technological Change in Open Economies
How does skill-biased technological change affect the relative wages of skilled labor in open economies. In this section we argue that the pervasiveness of a SBTC is key to establishing its long run influence on relative wages. In open economies the effect of local SBTC on relative wages is muted by the high price elasticity of product demand. In contrast, pervasive SBTC, occurring in many countries, will drive up the relative price of skill-intensive goods under fairly general conditions. That change in goods prices will induce an increase in the skill premium.
To illustrate the role of pervasiveness, we start with the extreme example of a small open economy, in which local SBTC has no effect on relative wages [Leamer 1994 ], but pervasive SBTC has a large effect [Krugman 1995] . While small economies provide a clear example, the mechanism is fairly general: the more pervasive the SBTC, the greater the effect on world prices 5 and thus on wages. We discuss generalizations below.
Consider the two factor, two good small open economy version of Heckscher-Ohlin theory with local technological change [Helpman and Krugman 1985] : Labor is either skilled or unskilled; Two goods are produced by constant returns to scale, quasi-concave production functions; Competition is perfect; All goods are produced in equilibrium; Preferences are homothetic; World prices are parameters. These assumptions imply that goods are priced according to marginal cost as free entry of firms in any country and constant returns to scale dictate zero profits. The resulting zero profit condition is where p i is the world price of good i and a li is the demand for factor l per unit of good i, which is a function of the wage vector, w. (For more detail see Berman, Bound and Machin [1997] .)
A. Stolper-Samuleson Effects and Sector-Biased Technological Change
The Lerner-Pierce diagram [Lerner (1952) ] provides a clear illustration of the effects of trade and technological change on wages. Here the unit-value isoquants C1 and C2 trace out combinations of inputs that produce one dollar of goods 1 and 2 respectively. The line AB tangent to those curves describes zero profit combinations of inputs at equilibrium wages. Its slope is the wage ratio -w U /w S .
To illustrate the Stolper-Samuelson effect, consider a shift from autarky to trade for a skill-abundant country. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem implies an increase in the relative price of good 1, the skill intensive good. In the diagram, that price change is reflected in the shift of C1 towards the origin, as less inputs are required to produce a dollar's worth of good 1.
Preserving zero-profit, relative wages of skilled labor increase, a change reflected in the decrease in w U /w S as the line of tangencies shifts from AB to EF. Now consider the effect on wages of technological change in the skill-intensive sector.
Figure I can also be used to illustrate Hicks-neutral technological progress occurring only for good 1. Assuming that these goods are traded, their prices are exogenously fixed (under the small country assumption). Technological progress in good 1 production reduces factor requirements, 5. Imagine sliding the isovalue curve C1' along the unit-cost line so that the point of tangency is at a different ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. Any of those locations represent the same unit cost of production. Though the skill-biases of those locations (technologies) differ, they all share the same solution for relative wages.
shifting the unit value isoquant toward the origin from C1 to C1'. This shift is Hicks-Neutral since at the old wage ratio the ratio of inputs S/U is unchanged, a condition reflected in the diagram by CD being parallel to AB. Profit opportunities in good 1 production will bid up the relative wage of skill, as in the Stolper-Samuelson case, a change reflected, as before, in the decrease in w U /w S as the line of tangencies shifts from AB to EF. Note that within both sectors, rays from the origin to points of tangency reflect lower ratios of S/U. That is to say, whether the change in relative wages is driven by changes in sector-specific prices or productivity, there is within-sector substitution away from skilled labor due to its new, higher, relative wage.
B. Skill-Biased Technological Change
A skill-biased technological change is an exogenous change in the production function that increases the unit demand ratio a Si / a Ui at the current wage level. Figure II illustrates the effects of a skill-biased technological change on wages.
Skill-biased technological change is reflected in the shift of unit cost curves C1 and C2 to C1' and C2'. This change is sector neutral in the sense that both C1 and C2 shift to lower levels of inputs in a way that reduces costs by the same proportion in each sector. The line CD, tangent to C1' and C2' reflects the new zero profit condition, and is parallel to AB, reflecting the same relative wages. These shifts are skill-biased as the new equilibrium ratios of skilled to unskilled workers are higher than the old. (Rays from the origin are steeper.) While a technological change which saves factors in the same proportion in each sector may seem artificial it provides a useful contrast to the sector-biased technological change of Figure I . Note the testable implication:
unlike Stolper-Samuelson effects, skill-biased technological change directly increases the proportion of skilled labor employed in each sector.
One feature of technological changes with fixed goods prices is that the skill bias of technological changes has no effect on relative wages [Leamer 1994] . 5 This appears particularly damning to the claim that skill-biased technological change increased the skill premium. 6. The integrated world economy is discussed in Helpman and Krugman [1985] . It behaves like the closed economy in Jones [1965] . Baldwin [1994] provides a clear graphical presentation.
7. Homothetic preferences are sufficient but not necessary for the increased skill premium. Krugman [1995] points out that a limit on the cross-elasticity of demand will do.
8. With a little care, this result will also generalize to the n>2 good case as in Ethier [1984] . Generalizations are much like those that allow the insensitivity of factor prices to changes in factor supplies [Leamer and Levinsohn 1995] , which also relies critically on perfectly elastic product demand. implies within-industry increases in the proportion of skilled workers.
How general is the result that pervasive SBTC will affect relative wages more than local SBTC? It clearly generalizes to a number of models with product demand curves that are less than perfectly elastic, such as large open economies [Baldwin, 1994] , locally produced goods which are imperfect substitutes for traded goods [Johnson and Stafford, forthcoming] and models with barriers to trade, as long as perfectly elastic product demand is preserved. 8 In all these cases open economies behave more like the closed economies in the sense that SBTC can affect goods prices.
While the contrast between the wage effects of a pervasive SBTC and those of a local SBTC is 8 9. Berman, Bound and Machin [1997] use the Worker Establishment Characteristics Database [Troske 1994 ], which matches the 1990 Census of Population to the Census of Manufactures. Standard occupational and educational measures correspond closely with the noproduction/production classifications of skill in manufacturing plants. 75 percent of nonproduction workers are in white collar occupations, while 81 percent of production workers are in blue collar occupations. 76 percent of nonproduction workers have at least some college education, while 61% of production workers have a high school education or less. BBG also defend the production/nonproduction classification, showing that the proportion of nonproduction workers follows the same trend increase as the proportion of skilled workers in U.S. manufacturing. Machin, Ryan and Van Reenen [1996] match manufacturing data and labor force surveys at the two digit industry level, and find that the correlation of nonproduction/production categories with educational categories is similar in the United Kingdom to that in the United States greatest in the small open economy model, it can also be large in more general models of trade, especially when product demand is elastic.
III. Testing the Implications of Alternative Explanations
Section II established that pervasive SBTC can affect relative wages regardless of the degree of openness of the economy. It also showed that among candidate causes of increased relative wages SBTC has a unique prediction: within industry skill-upgrading. If the dominant cause of increased skill premia in the United States is indeed pervasive SBTC, then it must be evident in all developed countries. We begin this section by reporting evidence on plant level skillupgrading despite increased relative wages in the United States and the United Kingdom. We then seek out the same pattern in a new, larger sample of OECD countries. Table I reproduces evidence of skill upgrading in the presence of increasing relative wages in both U.S. and British manufacturing, collecting estimates from several sources. The manufacturing sectors of both countries experienced large reductions in employment of less skilled (production) workers in the 1980s and a trend increase in the share of skilled (nonproduction) workers in employment. In that work and in this paper nonproduction workers are treated as skilled and production workers as unskilled. That mapping is supported by comparisons of skill classifications of the same individuals in plant and household surveys in Machin [1997], BBG and Machin, Ryan and Van Reenen [1996] . 9 The Table reports a decomposition of the increase in the aggregate employment share of nonproduction 9 workers into between-industry and within-industry components using the following decomposition:
Here S are skilled workers, U are unskilled, E is employment and an overstrike indicates a simple average over time. The weights are the industry employment shares in manufacturing employment.
The first column reports that between 1979 and 1987 the aggregate proportion of nonproduction workers in U.S. manufacturing increased by 0.55 percentage points per year. Of that increase 70% occurred within the 450 four-digit industries. Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske [1997] replicate this result at the plant level using the entire Census of Manufactures, showing that 71%
of the aggregate increase in Sn was due to within plant shifts in demand. Machin [1996b] reports similar results from the United Kingdom. There as well, most of the sizeable decrease in unskilled labor's share of manufacturing employment is due to within industry (and apparently within plant) decreases in demand for unskilled labor, despite its falling relative price.
If SBTC is pervasive, as in Section II, we should see the same pattern in all developed countries. The United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database [United Nations 1992] contains manufacturing employment and wagebill data for a large number of countries categorized into 28 consistently defined industries. We choose the most productive economies under the assumption that they are most likely to use the same production technologies as the United States.
From the set of countries without serious data problems we define our developed sample as the top twelve countries, ranked by GNP/capita in 1985. They range from the United States ($16,910) to Belgium ($8290). Appendix Table A1 reports the countries in order of rank. The
Appendix describes these data and our selection criteria in more detail.
In most of these developed countries manufacturing employment declined substantially (Table A1 ). The decline of 9% in the United States was typical. That employment decline was particularly severe for the (less-skilled) production workers who lost employment share to nonproduction workers in all sampled countries. 11. The wage ratio of nonproduction to production workers is a noisy measure of the preferable skill premium based on educational levels. In the 1980s the increased skill premiums in Table II are consistent with those reported in Davis [1992] , Freeman and Katz [1994] and Gottschalk and Joyce [1998] for the United States, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom. The decreased skill premium we report for Sweden is inconsistent with those sources. In the 1970s the decreased skill premiums in Table II are consistent with those sources for the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, while the increased premiums are inconsistent for Sweden and Germany. We do not know of an alternative source for the other six countries. Table II reports changes in nonproduction / production wage ratios (in column 6).
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Relative wages of nonproduction workers rose by an average of 4% in these developed countries in the 1980s. The U.S. increase of 7% was above average. Production workers lost employment share in all of these countries while suffering relative wage declines in 7 of the 10. This pattern is roughly consistent with a common description of European labor markets in the 1980s: they share the same phenomenon of decreased demand for less-skilled workers but differ in how it is expressed. In the United States and United Kingdom where wages are more flexible, the relative wages of the less-skilled declined sharply, while in European countries with less flexible wages reduced demand was expressed as unemployment [Freeman and Katz 1995, Krugman 1995] .
A. Pervasive Within Industry Skill Upgrading Table II substituted nonproduction for production workers despite increasing relative wages. Referring back to the discussion in Section II, increases in relative wages due (only) to Stolper-Samuelson effects imply negative "within" terms as firms substitute away from the input with an increasing relative wage. More generally, any increase in relative wages not due to a shift in the relative demand for skills at the industry level implies negative within terms. But a shift in relative demand for skills at the industry level (i.e. increased relative demand for skills, at fixed wages and prices)
is by definition a skill biased technological change.
Wagebill shares of nonproduction workers provide an additional way of looking at increased demand for skilled workers. If the elasticity of substitution between nonproduction and production workers is close to one, these shares provide a measure of demand robust to changes in relative wages. nonproduction workers seems to be due to cross-country variation in the supply of college educated workers (not shown), 13 a pattern consistent with the findings of Gottschalk and Joyce [1998] for several developed countries. Anticipating the discussion of an integrated equilibrium for developed countries below, the pattern of wages and employment in Table II is consistent with a trend increase in both supply and demand of skills, with either accelerated demand or decelerated supply in the 1980s increasing the skill premium on average, while local changes in supply affected relative wages as well.
In summary, in the developed countries for which we have manufacturing data in the 1970-1990 period, we find widespread within-industry substitution towards skilled labor, often despite increased relative wages. Applying the predictions of the analysis in the last section, that pattern indicates skill-biased technological change in all of these countries.
B. Alternative Explanations for Within-Industry Skill Upgrading
To interpret positive within-industry upgrading despite increased relative wages as evidence for SBTC one must assume homogeneous products within industries, which we did implicitly in Section II. Otherwise an industry might reallocate employment from low-skill intensive products to high-skill intensive, perhaps in reaction to a change in product prices. That within-industry skill upgrading need not be due to SBTC. This problem of aggregation in measurement is more severe for the coarse 28 industry classification of Table II than for the finer   plant level data of Table I , allowing more room for composition effects to masquerade as within unit effects. Yet, note that the "within" figures reported for the United States and the United Kingdom in Table II are not much higher than the comparable plant level figures reported in Table   I . Thus, a 28-industry decomposition seems to provide a good approximation of the plant level substitution and composition effects that we report in Table I .
Within plant skill upgrading could occur for a number of reasons besides SBTC. One possibility is capital investment combined with capital-skill complementarity. Previous work [BBG, Table VI ] has found that capital accumulation in U.S. manufacturing was not large enough 13 14. For a dissenting view see Krusell et al [1997] . They find, using aggregate data, that if capital equipment, particularly computers, is evaluated using a Gordon [1990] measure, its increase in value is fast enough to explain the increased demand for skills using a constant elasticity of substitution between capital and skill.
15. Materials files of the 1987 Census of Manufactures shows that 2 percent of materials purchased originate in the four-digit industry of the purchaser. 7 percent originate in the same three-digit industry.
to generate the observed increase in relative wages using cross-sectional estimates of the elasticity of substitution. 14 Another possible explanation is intraplant demand shifts towards skill-intensive goods. Considering the size of interplant shifts, it seems unlikely that this effect can be large.
Also, the increased relative price of skills should induce intraplant shifts in the opposite direction.
Wood [1991] and Bernard and Jensen [1997] have argued that an increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods, due to increased exposure to unskill-intensive developing countries, would induce intraplant substitution towards skill-intensive goods. BBG [Table IV ] test that hypothesis, finding that only a tiny fraction of within industry increase in the proportion of nonproduction workers can be explained by net imports using a fixed factor model, so that trade-induced within plant composition effects are probably negligible. A third possibility is skill-biased product innovations, which can be thought of as SBTC for our purposes. A fourth possible explanation is intraplant skill upgrading induced by trade through an H-O effect whereby firms "outsource" lowskill parts of the production process abroad, replacing in-house production with imported materials [Feenstra and Hanson 1996a , 1996b .
While it is hard to measure outsourcing, let alone its effect on U.S. employment, two calculations suggest that outsourcing is responsible for at most a fraction of skill upgrading. First, BBG report that skill-upgrading occurred no more rapidly in import intensive industries than in the rest of U.S. manufacturing in the 1980s [BBG, Feenstra and Hanson [1996b, 1997] use different methods to estimate the magnitude of foreign "outsourcing". First, they multiply materials purchased by the proportion of imports in their source industry. Their estimate is that, as of 1990, 11.6 percent of materials could represent outsourcing, rather than 8 percent. (Feenstra and Hanson emphasize that contract work could explain the difference between these estimates, since it is included in imports, but not in imported materials.) Nevertheless, both figures are likely to be substantial overestimates, as most imported materials probably do not replace in-house production. When Feenstra and Hanson redo their calculation restricting attention to purchases with an establishments' two digit industry, their 11.6 percent estimate drops to 5.6 percent. Second, using regression techniques, Feenstra and Hanson [1997] estimate that outsourcing can account for as much as 15 percent of the within industry shift away from production labor during the 1980s. Baru [1995] uses similar measures, but calculates outsourcing using only purchases within the same three digit industry. She estimates a translog variable cost function using data on 51 three and four digit importing and exporting industries, and finds no association between changes in the price of imported materials and skill upgrading. Given the potential for measurement error in the variables and the apparent lack of robustness of the results, we put more stock in the back of the envelope calculations, which are likely to exaggerate effects.
that only a small fraction of imported materials represent outsourcing (as they do not replace domestic production in the same industry). Extending that calculation, assume that imported materials displace production but not nonproduction labor and that imported materials embody the same amount of production labor as do domestically produced goods in the same industry (but no nonproduction labor). Thus, for each industry, we calculate that the number of production workers displaced by outsourcing as of 1987 as (imported materials/total shipments) production employment. These calculations suggest that the employment of production workers Outsourcing may be important in some industries. For example, as of 1987, 806 and 807 imports represented 57 percent of imports in the auto industry and 44 percent of imports of semiconductors. A calculation similar to the one above suggests that these imports are sufficient to account for more than 100 percent of the shift away from production workers that occurred in the auto industry and one-third of the shift that occurred in semiconductors. (Figures on the overseas production of semiconductors are consistent with these calculations [United States International Trade Commission, 1982] .) However, foreign outsourcing is concentrated enough in specific industries that it is hard to imagine it accounting for more than a small fraction of the total, within-industry shift away from production labor.
the value of such items totaled a not insignificant 68.6 billion dollars. However, the automobile industry, which accounted for only 3 percent of total skill upgrading accounted for roughly two-thirds of such imports. Eliminating both the auto industry and domestic content of such items reduces the 68.6 billion to 14.0 billion or roughly 0.5 percent of the value of manufacturing shipments that year---too small a quantity to matter very much [United States International Trade
Commission 1988].
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Our estimates are crude, but they err on the side of overestimating the effects of outsourcing on skill upgrading: Not all foreign materials represent outsourcing. For those that do, some nonproduction labor is certainly embodied in domestic production replaced by outsourcing.
Still, these calculations suggest that while outsourcing might be important for some industries it cannot account for the bulk of the skill upgrading that occurred within manufacturing over the 1970s and 1980s. Calculations based on U.S. data also overstate the potential share of outsourcing in within industry skill upgrading in the OECD as a whole, since the United States had a much greater increase in trade with the developing world than did the average developed country in the 1980s. We conclude that the majority of within industry upgrading reported in Table II is due not to outsourcing, but to skill biased technological change, implying pervasive SBTC among the developed countries in the 1980s. 18. Luxembourg has been dropped as it has only 6 observed industries in this period. Norway and Germany was dropped for lack of employment share figures in 1980-1990.
IV. Cross Country Correlations: An Additional Test of Pervasiveness

A. Cross Country Correlations
The variation in rates of skill-upgrading across industries provides another testable implication of SBTC. We should find the same industries increasing their proportion of skilled workers at similar rates in different countries. Figure III 
Pervasive skill-biased technological change implies that (holding relative wages constant,)
within-industry changes in the use of skills will be positively correlated across all countries producing that good. So we test for pervasiveness by examining cross-country correlations of changes in the use of skills (Sn) for our entire developed sample.
Table IV presents a correlation matrix of weighted correlations of Sn ci with Sn c'i , the cross-country, within-industry changes in the proportion of nonproduction workers for nine developed countries in the 1980s. 18 For example, the first column reports that skill upgrading (Sn) in U.S. industries is positively and highly correlated with skill upgrading in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom and Belgium and positively correlated with skill upgrading in the other three countries. Stars denote a significant correlation at the 5 percent level.
Note that the correlations are nearly all positive (33 of 36) and some are quite high. Indeed, 11 of the 36 are significantly positive at the 5 percent level (which is much more than the expected two and a half percent). These results are robust to changes in the choice of weights and to using 19. Correlations of wagebill shares show 12 of 36 to be significantly positive. All results are essentially unaffected by using employment weights averaged only over the two paired countries.
20. We thank the editors for this insight.
wagebill rather than employment shares. 19 The high number of precisely estimated large positive correlations is remarkable considering the potential for measurement error. These data are collected from separate national institutions with heterogeneous methods and sampling techniques (see Appendix). Moreover, the fairly aggregated industry classifications imply that the same (2.5 digit) industry may contain very different four digit industries in different countries. 
V. Global Skill-Biased Technological Change?
How pervasive is skill biased technological change? So far we have discussed SBTC in developed countries. Looking for evidence of SBTC in developing countries is interesting for two reasons. First, it provides another source of evidence. Second, the implications for income inequality may be greater in countries where less skilled workers are already extremely poor.
In a H-O framework, for a country that is abundant in unskilled labor, the opening up to Nevertheless, the combination of these findings and the evidence presented above that SBTC was pervasive in the developed world raise the intriguing possibility that SBTC is at work in the developing world as well.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented strong evidence that the kind of skill biased technological change which occurred in the United States in the 1980s was pervasive throughout the developed world. Our data show that: a) substitution towards skilled labor within industries occurred in all ten developed countries that we studied, despite generally constant or increasing relative wages of skilled labor, and b) the same manufacturing industries that substituted toward skilled labor in the United States in the 1980s did so in the other developed countries as well. The three industries 21 22. For a justification of the use of factor content calculations in approximating the effects of trade flows on relative wages, see Krugman [1995] or Deardorff and Staiger [1988] .
with the largest within-industry contributions to skill upgrading are machinery (and computers), electrical machinery, and printing and publishing. All three carried out significant microprocessorbased technological innovation, suggesting microprocessors as the technological link between common patterns of skill-upgrading across countries.
The debate in the literature over the effects of SBTC on relative wages has often turned on the relevance of the small, open economy assumptions [Freeman 1995 , Leamer 1996 .
Pervasiveness allows SBTC to reduce the relative wages of the unskilled even in a model that Though the evidence we present is only from manufacturing, where measurement is easiest, the effects of SBTC on wages may be just as important in the service sectors. In retail and 24. Haskell and Slaughter [1998] and Jones [1965] analyze the possibility that technological change is both skill and sector biased.
25. Institutional factors such as the decline in the real value of the minimum wage and in unionization may have also played a role explaining the rise in the relative wages of skilled workers in some countries, however such factors have probably not contributed to within and between sectors shifts in employment, which have both favored skilled workers.
financial services, for example, microprocessor-based information processing technologies have dramatically changed accounting and secretarial work [Levy and Murnane 1996] . At a more aggregate level, Bound and Johnson [1992] , Murphy and Welch [1992] and Katz and Murphy [1992] all present evidence of within-industry skill upgrading in other sectors, despite increased relative wages of skilled workers. Within industry skill upgrading outside of manufacturing also occurred in the same industries in the United States as it did in the United Kingdom. 23 Skillbiased technological change outside of manufacturing may also have been pervasive and is an additional likely cause of decreased demand for less skilled workers.
Even if pervasive SBTC is a principal explanation, there is no reason to believe that it is the sole explanation for increased relative demand for skills. Heckscher-Ohlin trade and sectorbiased technical change 24 have presumably both played a role in shifting employment towards sectors of the economy that are intensive in skilled labor. Particular groups, such as very low skilled workers, may be particularly affected by increased imports. These effects may have increased in the 1990s with increased trade with LDCs. However, the observed between industry employment shifts in the 1980s do not appear to be nearly large enough to explain the bulk of the shift in demand towards skilled labor.
25
Pervasive skill-biased technological change suggests several avenues for interesting research. The source of SBTC, its rate of flow across borders, the identification of the technologies involved and the likely implications for labor demand in the receiving country are all interesting and relevant. This is especially true for developing countries in which technological changes could exacerbate current high levels of income inequality.
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DATA APPENDIX
The data are from the United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database. They cover 28 manufacturing industries at (broadly) the 2 to 3-digit level, consistently defined across countries and years. Data are collected by the United Nations directly from the appropriate statistical agencies in each country. The main purpose is to facilitate international comparisons relating to the manufacturing sector. For our analysis the key data included are the employment and wage bills of all employees and operatives. "Employees" is usually the average number of employees during the year (other than working proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers). "Operatives" usually refers to employees directly engaged in production or related activities of the establishment, including clerks or working supervisors whose function is to record or expedite any step in the production process. Employees of a similar type engaged in activities ancillary to the main activity of the establishment and those engaged in truck driving, repair and maintenance and so on, are also considered to be operatives. Wages and salaries includes all payments in cash or in kind made to employees or operatives during the reference year (these include: direct wages and salaries; remuneration for time not worked; bonuses and gratuities; housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer; payments in kind).
The sample of countries selected was dictated by the availability of consistently defined data on employment and wage bills for all employees and operatives over time. The resulting developed country sample includes the 12 highest ranked countries (in 1985 GNP per capita) that meet our selection criteria. For the wider sample of countries used if Figures A1 and A2 Within-industry/plant component (percent)
.387
.341*
.301
.34
Between-industry/plant component (percent)
.165
.077*
.066
. a. The change in aggregate proportion of nonproduction workers can be decomposed into a component due to reallocation of employment between industries with different proportions of skilled workers and another due to changes in the proportion of skilled workers within industries. The percentage within is calculated by dividing the second term of equation (2) in the text by the sum of both terms. b. Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database. c. There are 28 industries in this classification for all countries except Belgium (20), W. Germany (22), Japan (27), Luxembourg (9 in 1970 -80, 6 in 1980 and Norway (26). For these countries aggregate changes and "within" calculations are based upon the reduced set of industries. Appendix Table A2 includes an industry list. See Data Appendix for details. * The sampling frame changed for Japanese data between 1970 and 1981. Luxembourg (9 in 1970 Luxembourg (9 in -80, 6 in 1980 and Norway (26). For these countries aggregate changes and "within" calculations are based upon the reduced set of industries. Appendix Table A2 includes an industry list. See Data Appendix for details. * The sampling frame changed for Japanese data between 1970 and 1981. The number in brackets is the significance level of a two-tailed test that the correlation is zero. A * denotes a significant correlation at the 5 percent level. c.
The sample was restricted to countries with GNP/capita of over $8000 US in 1985 and twenty or more consistently defined industries observed in 1980-1990. d .
The 28 industries in this classification are listed fully in Appendix table A2. e.
All correlation coefficients are calculated using a full set of 28 industries, except those involving Japan (27), Belgium (20) and Japan & Belgium (19). f.
Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database. a.
In a regression of "within" industry terms on country and industry indicators, the table reports the three largest estimated industry effects i . y ci is the change in the proportion of nonproduction workers in employment multiplied by the industry's weight in manufacturing employment. b.
A full set of industry effects is reported in Table A2 . c.
Data are scaled so that the estimated coefficient represents the ratio of the industry effect to the cross country average "within" component. d.
The root mean squared error of the left-hand side variable is .0670 for 1970-80 and .0894 for 1980-90. e.
Standard errors are calculated using the White heteroskedasticity robust formula. f.
Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database. Sources: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database (numbers for ISIC 3000, total manufacturing). GNP per capita data from World Bank (1994) "World Tables", country tables. The levels are not reliable for Japan as the number of operatives is only counted for a subsample of large firms, while employment is counted for all firms. The changes considered should be more reliable over the 1981-90 period when the definition of large firms remained the same. Notes: Estimating equation is equation (3) in the text. Coefficients are scaled so that the reported coefficient represents the ratio of the industry effect to the cross country average "within" component. The root mean squared error of the LHS var is .0670 for 1970-80 and .0894 for 1980-90. t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Countries included are all those included in Tables IV and V. Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database. Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database.
